In this essay I am going to examine the claim that envy, traditionally seen as a negative character trait, could be considered as an artistically creative virtue. First of all, I will clarify what I mean by virtue and vice, and give a definition of what envy is, making the distinction between benign envy and malicious envy, and discuss whether either of these types of envy could constitute a creative virtue. I will argue that benign envy could be seen as a creative virtue, whereas malicious envy cannot, before assessing the claim that benign envy is not really envy and put forward an alternative definition of envy, which allows for this.
There are many definitions of virtue and vice, but in this essay when I refer to something being a virtue, I am saying that it is an excellence of character and when I talk about vices I am referring to things that are a viciousness of weakness of character. When discussing character with regards to virtue and vice, there are a number of things I could mean. I could be talking about moral character, intellectual character, creative character and so on.1 A creative virtue then, is an excellence of the creative character and a moral vice is a trait that is a viciousness or weakness of the moral character. So it would not be inconsistent for me to consider that envy could be a moral vice, but also a creative virtue.
Now, let us consider what it is to be envious. It seems that to envy someone is to desire something they have, in a particular way. It is not the same as admiring someone (or their possessions) or simply wishing that you had what they have. Envy is characterised by a desire to level the difference with the other person.2 The reason we might think that this could be a creative virtue is that we might think that wanting to level the difference would inspire us to act towards bettering our own skills. However, it seems that some envious people are not motivated in such a way. Rather than attempting to improve themselves, they merely have feelings of resentment towards the rival (which in some cases may spur them to behave unpleasantly towards them, though this is not necessary).
This leads me to the distinction between two types of envy: “benign” envy and “malicious” envy. These two types of envy involve different ideas about how to level the difference with another. Benign envy is an expression of the desire to level the difference with a rival by bringing one's self up to their level. For instance, I might see an amazing painting and be envious of that painter's skills. If I was experiencing benign envy, then my reaction would be that I wanted to improve my own painting skills. Malicious envy, on the other hand, expresses a desire to bring a rival down to one's own level. So in the case of the painter I envied, if I was experiencing malicious envy, I might have the desire to somehow sabotage her career.3 It seems as though we are more likely to feel one or the other type of envy, depending on whether or not we perceive the rival as deserving what they have. If, for instance, I believed that my rival was naturally talented but had also worked very hard on her painting I would be more likely to experience benign envy due to having the belief that she was indeed deserving. On the other hand, if I thought she was not very talented and didn't put much effort into her work and that she produced good artwork merely as a fluke, I may tend towards malicious envy, believing that she was not deserving.
When thinking about creative virtues and vices, distinguishing between benign envy and malicious envy is particularly important, because the desire to bring ourselves to the level of our rivals and the desire to bring our rivals down to our level are two distinct goals. If one person is aiming towards one particular goal and another person towards a different goal, it is plausible to suggest that the ways in which they go about achieving their goals may be very different. Suppose once more that I envy a particular painter, and that in this case I am experiencing malicious envy. I might be motivated to cause her to have an accident in which she breaks her fingers, which would mean that she was unable to paint. These kinds of unsavoury thoughts or behaviour make it seem as though malicious envy could not be a creative virtue, as this would do nothing to improve my creativity.
However, imagine that I am envious of that same painter, but I am experiencing benign envy. This may motivate me to improve my own artwork by studying various painting techniques and practising whenever I have free time. It seems plausible to say that benign envy could constitute a creative virtue as it does have the potential to encourage creativity. So, it is tempting to say that while malicious envy does not appear to be, benign envy may well be a creative virtue.
Some people might want to argue that although benign envy may lead us to feel motivated, it would be more virtuous to feel admiration, and that this could have the same effects. I don't think that this seems quite right, as it is perfectly possible to feel admiration for someone's skills or qualities without wanting to improve yourself, whereas one of the characteristics of benign envy is the desire to improve yourself, bringing yourself up to the level of your rival.
Certain psychological studies seem to support this thesis. One such study was recently published in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. The aim was to test the hypothesis that people experiencing benign envy, rather than malicious envy or admiration, were most motivated to improve themselves. The outcome was that, firstly, the participants experiencing benign envy were motivated to study more and work harder than those who were either in a neutral condition or experiencing admiration or malicious envy. Secondly, the experience of benign envy was tied to actual performance on tests related to intellectual and creative abilities, with the participants experiencing benign envy outperforming those who were experiencing admiration, malicious envy or who were in a neutral condition. The study also seemed to show that circumstances that breed feelings of benign envy typically involve the subject having the belief that self-improvement is within the realms of possibility. Those who believed that self-improvement was extremely difficult were more likely to experience either admiration or malicious envy.4
This last point may lead us to question whether motivation may in fact be related to self-esteem, rather than benign envy. It sounds plausible that people who believe in themselves may be more likely to succeed at their goals. They would probably be more motivated and less likely to give up, should they run into difficulties, whereas those with lower self-esteem may convince themselves that they are unable to succeed. However, in light of the aforementioned study, I do not think it would be correct to say that self-belief alone is what motivates us. It would be perfectly possible for someone to have healthy self-esteem but be experiencing malicious envy – perhaps they are under the impression that their rival is undeserving. If this was the case, they may be motivated in more destructive ways, such as unpleasant behaviour towards the rival rather than directing their energy into their own projects. Since self-belief and benign envy can be separated from one another, it seems that we must maintain the view that benign envy appears to be a creative virtue in itself, rather than just something that often accompanies healthy self-esteem.
However, there is a more serious claim to be made in opposition to the notion of envy as a creative virtue. It can be said that benign envy is not really envy at all. Looking back to the definition of envy that I explained earlier – a desire to level the difference between yourself and a rival – this would not be true. But if this definition of envy is incorrect or incomplete, then it is possible that what we call benign envy is not really envy. I think it sounds reasonable to say that if I were experiencing admiration towards a rival, I could still be inspired by them and motivated to work hard on my own projects. How this differs from benign envy, if indeed it does, is unclear. Motivation for self-improvement is not a necessary condition for admiration, but it is plausible to say that it could occur in some cases of admiration and not others. Perhaps, for instance, when admiration is coupled with high self-esteem, an individual is more likely to be motivated.
Silver and Sabini give an account of envy that seems consistent with this. On their account, an individual is experiencing envy if their emotional reaction towards another's success is in some way inappropriate or unjustified.5 Imagine that my friend and I enter a poetry contest. We both work very hard on our poems, but in the end it is my friend who wins the contest. He behaves very modestly about this, yet I still have ill feelings towards him. This is an example of envy, because my ill feelings towards my friend are unjustified and not appropriate to the situation. However, if he had come up to me after winning the contest boasting of him talent and belittling my attempts at writing, I would be quite justified in being angry with him. So in this case, even though I could still wish that I'd won the contest, what I felt would not constitute envy.
In this paper, there is also an example that seems to fall under the category of what was referred to (by Van de Ven et al) as benign envy. Silver and Sabini mention a sports team who have lost a game, and are now motivated to do better. They clearly desire to win (and therefore level the difference between themselves and the rival team). Here though, the authors do not consider this to be an instance of envy, because there is no unjustified or inappropriate response towards the other team.6
I think that this definition of envy is perhaps more consistent than those centring around the distinction between benign and malicious envy. On this account, what is important when we try to recognise envy is the way an individual feels towards their rival, rather than the way in which they desire to level the difference. This makes it possible for us to say that those who are motivated to level the difference between themselves and a friendly rival, but have no inappropriate or unjustified ill feelings towards them, are likely motivated by admiration. Of course, it does not seem ridiculous to suggest that someone could have unjustified ill feelings towards a rival and still be motivated to better themselves, rather than undermine the other person.
If this is the case, then we can potentially classify envy as a artistically creative virtue. However, it would be fair to say that when combined with certain other traits (such as low-self esteem, pessimism or vindictiveness) it may not motivate individuals to better themselves and instead lead to behaviour which is of little or no value as far as creativity is concerned. Rather than focussing on individual traits, it makes more sense to focus on the relationships between different traits. For instance, envy could be a good trait to have for an individual who is also hard working and optimistic, as it may help to push them towards achieving their goals. But perhaps it would be less so for an individual who is lazy and pessimistic, as they would be more likely to give up, if they even began working towards their goals. In conclusion, what we need to do is look at the creative character as a whole if we wish to truly understand what character traits, or rather combinations of character traits, make a person artistically creative.
References:
1Kieran, Matthew, “Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art” Lecture 6: Admiration and Envy
2Kieran, Matthew, “Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art” Lecture 6: Admiration and Envy
3D'Arms, Justin, "Envy",The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4 Van de Ven, Niels, Marcel Zeelenberg & Rik Pieters, “Why Envy Outperforms Admiration”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37 (6): pp.784-95
5Silver, Maury & Sabini, John, “The Perception of Envy”, Social Pyschology 41 (2) pp. 105-108
6Silver, Maury & Sabini, John, “The Perception of Envy”, Social Pyschology 41 (2) p. 108
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